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While China’s image abroad is primarily shaped by its economic and military growth, 
the rising power is also making strides toward greater global soft power projection. Apart 
from hosting large events such as the 2008 Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai Expo, the 
Chinese government also invested $8.7 billion between 2009 and 2010 promoting the 
influence of Chinese media internationally.1 Still more ambitious is the expansion of 
education domestically and globally, as Chinese leaders consider promotion of Chinese 
language and culture crucial components of China’s soft power.2 According to The New 
Persuaders, an annual global ranking of soft power by Jonathan McClory at the Institute of 
Government, China ranked 7th in both culture and education as indicators for soft power in 
2011;3 in 2012, China ranked 6th in culture and 5th in education.4 In 1978, about 2000 foreign 
students studied in China;5 by 2012, the number had risen to 328,330.6 China has now 
become the third most popular study destinations in the world, only after the United States 
and the UK.7 In addition, the Chinese Ministry of Education published its plan to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 David Shambaugh, “China Flexes Its Soft Power,” The New York Times, 7 June 2010, Web. 17 Nov. 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/08/opinion/08iht-edshambaugh.html?_r=0. 
2 “Hujintao tichu, tuidong shehui zhuyi wenhua dafazhan dafanrong” 胡锦涛提出，推动社会主义文化大发展
大繁荣 [Hu Jintao Says ‘Promote the Development and Prosperity of Socialist Culture’], Xinhua News, 15 
October 2007, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/104019/104098/6378677.html. 
3 Jonathan McClory, “The New Persuaders II”, Institute for Government, (2011): 19.   
4 Jonathan McClory, “The New Persuaders III”, Institute fir Government, (2012): 12. 
5 Jian Wang, “Introduction: China’s Search of Soft Power,” Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through 
Communication, ed. Jian Wang (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011): 4-5. 
6 “Statistical Report for Foreign Students in China in 2012,” Jiangsu Education, 29 Mar. 2013, web. 20 Apr. 
2015, http://www.admissions.cn/news/364282.shtml. 
7 “China Now the World’s Third Most-Popular Study Destination,” ICEF Monitor, 11 June 2014, web. 17 Nov. 
2014, http://monitor.icef.com/2014/06/china-now-the-worlds-third-most-popular-study-destination/. 
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accommodate more than 500,000 international students by 2020, with 150,000 receiving 
higher education.8 
My research primarily focuses on China’s soft power in the Arab World through 
higher education. While Arab students studying in China is still a relatively new phenomenon 
and their numbers still limited, the Chinese government is expanding scholarship programs 
that have attracted increasing numbers of Arab students to Chinese universities. This move 
coincides with China’s growing demand for oil, need to expand overseas markets, as well as 
increasing assertiveness in diplomatic gestures. With rising hard power influence in the 
Middle East and North Africa, China is also determined to expand its soft power in education, 
culture, and other potential fields. My question is, then, how effective are China’s higher 
educational programs for Arab students in enhancing its soft power in the Arab World? 
Following Joseph Nye’s work, I define soft power as “the ability to get what you want 
through attraction rather than through coercion or payments.”9 In this study, I argue that 
Chinese higher educational programs for Arab students can increase China’s soft power. 
Regardless of the length of time they spend in China, almost all sampled Arab students have 
demonstrated increased familiarity with Chinese culture, language, and society as a result of 
their study abroad experience. Contrary to the largely ambiguous image of China among the 
Arab public, the overwhelming majority of our sampled Arab students report more positive 
impressions of China overall, and many envision themselves working in fields that are 
beneficial for future Sino-Arab relations.  
In this chapter, I will take a brief look at previous scholarly work on soft power and 
how educational exchange can contribute to a state’s soft power. Then I will examine the soft 
power discourse within a Chinese context, explain China’s interest in cultivating soft power 
in the Arab World, and offer some insights on Arab public impressions of China. I will then 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Cheng Yingqi, “International students' scholarships to increase,” China Daily, 26 Apr. 2012, web. 17 Nov. 
2014, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-04/26/content_15143504.htm. 
9 Joseph Nye, “Soft Power And Higher Education,” Internet and the University Forum (2005): 11. 
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go on to discuss China’s education outreach to the Arab World in recent years, as well as 
some details of Chinese university programs for Arab students. 
Chapter 2 is an analysis of my survey conducted with 112 Arab students who have 
studied in China. Through statistical analysis of the survey results, I attempt to understand 
how studying in China changes Arab students’ perceptions of China and what it means for 
China’s soft power in the MENA region. The chapter is adapted from a paper that I co-
authored with Sara Rathod in December 2014. We have found that studying in China can 
lead to more positive feelings about China among Arab students, which can potentially 
increase China’s soft power.  
Chapter 3 includes a transcription of my interviews with 8 Arab students. I asked the 
interviewees a series of questions covering topics such as their overall impressions of China, 
university life in China, as well as personal development and understanding of Sino-Arab 
relations. As a complement to the survey, the interviews shed light on the experiences of 
individual Arab students in China. The chapter also points out several problems of Chinese 
university programs. 
In the last chapter, I will outline several recommendations on how to improve Chinese 
university programs, how the Chinese government can better accommodate Arab students 
seeking careers in China, opportunities and challenges of China’s larger soft power scheme 
such as the Belt and Road initiative, how Arab students can potentially contribute to Chinese 
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Soft Power and Education ∗ 
Simply put, soft power is attractive power.10 A country’s soft power, according to 
Nye, rests on three sources: culture, political values, and foreign policies.11  While hard 
power often involves threats and inducements as means to ensure compliance, soft power 
requires that a state’s qualities attract others into cooperation. Examples of American soft 
power include foreign students studying in the United States, worldwide consumption of 
American media products, and the widespread acceptance of American political values such 
as freedom and individualism.12 
There is a wide range of literature discussing soft power in international relations, but 
it is largely centered on the United States and often dating back to the Cold War. For example, 
George Kennan’s writing reveals the motives of cultural exchange between the United States 
and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.13 As a means to understand and engage the enemy, 
student exchange programs during the Cold War served mainly as an alternative to, or 
complement of, hard power struggle at the time. As the soft power concept made its way into 
Chinese official rhetoric in the early 2000s, a number of Chinese scholars also put forth their 
own definitions of soft power that specifically fit in China’s case. Zhu Feng defines soft 
power as “whether the international community accepts a nation’s policies and strategic 
choices and to what extent those choices accord with most nations’ interest,”14 emphasizing 
the legitimacy of state policies as a source of soft power. At a time when much of the world 
remains skeptical about the motives of a rising China, developing soft power becomes a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
∗ This section is adapted from “China’s expansion of soft power in the Arab World through educational 
exchange,” a paper that I co-authored with Sara Rathod for a class project in 2014.  
10 Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), 6. 
11 Joseph Nye, “Soft Power And Higher Education,” 11. 
12 Ibid, 11. 
13 George F. Kennan, “International Exchange in the Arts,” The International Council of the Museum of Modern 
Art in New York (1956). 
14 Mingjiang Li, “Introduction: Soft Power: Nurture Not Nature,” Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in 
International Politics, Mingjiang Li ed., (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009): 6. 
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crucial strategy for China to cultivate and sustain a benign international environment for its 
continued growth. 
Both theory and anecdotal evidence suggest that study abroad programs can enhance 
the host country’s soft power. Soviet visitors who participated in the Cold War educational 
exchanges in the United States often absorbed American political values and some went on to 
become liberalizing influences on the Soviet government.15 Carol Atkinson is one of the few 
researchers who have systematically evaluated the link between educational exchange and 
soft power. Using a statistical analysis of student exchange programs from 1980-2006, her 
research shows that countries with increased participation in civilian and military exchange 
programs in the United States experienced improved human rights standards over time.16 She 
concluded that educational exchange programs in the United States enhanced U.S. soft power 
by spreading liberal ideals of freedom of movement, speech, religion, political participation 
and workers rights. However, there has been no previous research on whether educational 
exchange can play similar roles in enhancing the soft power of countries like China, where 
political values are quite different from those in the United States.  
A number of studies have also shown the length of study abroad programs can affect 
the extent to which students’ personal characteristics and political ideas are shaped by their 
study abroad experience, although these studies do not explicitly address soft power. For 
example, Beth Anne Z. Zielinski finds that longer study abroad programs are associated with 
greater flexibility and openness, which makes students more receptive to different cultures 
and ways of thinking.17 Mary M. Dwyer finds that students who study abroad for a full year 
not only show a greater understanding of their own cultural values and biases, but they have 
also developed more sophisticated views of the world compared to students who studied 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Nye, “Soft Power And Higher Education”, 14. 
16 Carol Atkinson, “Does Soft Power Matter? A Comparative Analysis of Student Exchange Programs 1980–
2006,” Foreign Policy Analysis 6 (2010), 19. 
17 Beth Anne Z. Zielinski, “Study Abroad Length of Program Influence on Cross-Cultural Adaptability,” 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2007. 
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abroad for a semester or a term.18 She also concludes that full-year students are somewhat 
more likely to have changed, refined and/or continued to be influenced in their political and 
social views due to studying abroad.19 Following Zielinski and Dwyer’s conclusions, I 
attempt to evaluate whether the length of time that Arab students spend in China has any 
influence on their receptiveness of China’s soft power in the next chapter. 
 
 
China, Soft Power, and the Arab World 
The term “soft power” made its way into the Chinese academia as early as 1997, 
where it quickly evolved into an official rhetoric in the early 2000s.20 At a time when China’s 
rapid economic and military expansion sparked worldwide concerns of its intentions, Nye’s 
soft power rhetoric turned out incredibly appropriate. Fostering a favorable international 
environment is crucial for ensuring China’s sustainable development without hindrance from 
outside, especially since many Chinese feel that the country is often subject to 
misinterpretation and insidious attacks of foreign media.21 Moreover, a great power cannot be 
built on hard power alone, but it has to be a cultural center of the world where ideas, values, 
social life and beliefs are attractive to people elsewhere, as China once was during the Tang 
Dynasty.22  
There are several reasons to believe that China’s soft power may work differently 
from American soft power. First, the Chinese brand of soft power is inherently different from 
that of the U.S.. As Nye has argued, the same soft power source that attracts some can repulse 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Mary M. Dwyer, “More Is Better: The Impact of Study Abroad Program Duration,” Frontiers: The 
Interdisciplinary Journal of Study Abroad 10 (2004), 160. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Hongying Wang and Yeh-cheung Lu, “The Conception of Soft Power and Its Policy Implications: A 
Comparative Study of China and Taiwan,” Journal of Contemporary China, 17, No. 56 (2008): 426. 
21 Qingguo Jia, “Continuity and Change: China’s Attitude toward Hard Power and Soft Power,” Brookings East 
Asia Commentary, Number 44 (December 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/12/china-
soft-power-jia.  
22 Ibid, 30. 
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others, and the Middle East is one region where American soft power has little or even 
negative impacts on the image of the United States. Media products portraying an open, free 
America may also convey messages of immorality and decadence depending on the cultural 
context. China, on the other hand, approaches Arab states emphasizing common cultural, 
religious heritage as well as shared economic interests with no political strings attached. As 
Kurlantzick wrote, “China's nonintervention can provide a sharp contrast with the United 
States, which Chinese officials paint as a hegemon unwilling to listen to other nation's 
concerns and slapping sanctions on other countries.”23 While the United States is mainly 
interested in building bilateral ties with strategically important partners, China demonstrates 
significant respect to even the smallest countries, making their heads of state appreciate the 
equal treatment that they may not get in Washington.24 
Second, China has not promoted its soft power as aggressively as the United States 
has. From the Cold War to the Arab Spring, from Hollywood films to Voice of America radio 
propaganda, the United States has actively promoted American political values in order to 
win the “battle of ideas.”25 In contrast, China’s diplomatic practice explicitly rejects 
intervention in other states’ internal affairs. China’s use of soft power abroad is characterized 
by defensive purposes such as cultivating a better Chinese image, correcting misperceptions 
of China, and fending off Western cultural and political inroads in China.26 Yet, the lack of 
media efficacy internationally is a significant weakness of Chinese soft power due to its 
limited reach, propagandistic tone, and disconnection with audience from different cultural 
and political backgrounds. As a result, the dominance of Western media continues to have 
profound negative effects on Sino-Arab relations. While its negative portrayal of the Arab 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World (New York: Yale 
University Press, 2007): 49. 
24 Ibid, 58. 
25 “The National Security Strategy of The United States,” United States National Security Council (2006), 9. 
26 Mingjiang Li, “Soft Power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity and Prospect,” Soft Power: China’s Emerging 
Strategy in International Politics, ed. Mingjiang Li (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009), 22.  
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World makes its way to the Chinese audience, the negative portrayal of China also leaves an 
impression on the Arab audience.27 
Third, a unique component of Chinese soft power in the Middle East is that China has 
demonstrated how an ancient, non-Western civilization can reestablish itself in the modern 
era. Not only do two regions share historical and cultural traditions, but they were both 
homes to the world’s greatest civilizations and both suffered from imperial aggressions as 
well. As a result, the Chinese success story is particularly attractive to Arab states, which 
may make Arab states more receptive to China’s soft power.28 Men Honghua, professor at the 
Party School of the CPC Central Committee, argued that development model should as an 
indicator of a country’s soft power in addition to culture, values, international institutions, 
and international image.29 While China still faces a number of domestic developmental 
challenges, scholarly discussions of a “Beijing Consensus” in contrast to the Washington 
Consensus have already demonstrated the potential appeal of the China’s state-centric 
economic liberalization with minimal political liberalization model to many developing 
countries, including those in the Arab World.30 
Fourth, economic diplomacy and trade have been the primary factors shaping China’s 
image in the Arab World. By contrast, the impression of the United States in the Arab World 
is often a direct result of American foreign policies and military involvement. The difference 
in the nature of U.S. and Chinese involvement in the Arab region may result in different 
public impressions of the United States and China. However, extensive trade relations can 
have dual effects on China’s image in the Arab World as well. One the one hand, China’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Lirong Ma, “Lun xifang chuanmei zai zhonga hezuo zhong de zuzhang zuoyong” 论西方传媒在中阿合作中
的阻障作用 [Western Media’s Hindrance in Sino-Arab Cooperation], Arab World Studies, No. 6 (2005): 53-58. 
28 Jon B. Alterman, “China’s Soft Power in the Middle East,” Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the 
United States: Competition and Cooperation in the Developing World (CSIS Reports), ed, Carola McGiffert, 
(Center for Strategic and International Studies: 2009), 72. 
29 Men Honghua, “Zhongguo ruanshili pinggu baogao”中国软实力评估报告 [China’s Soft Power Assessment 
Report], International Review, No.2 (2007): 15. 
30 Yongjin Zhang, “The Discourse of China’s Soft Power and Its Discontent,” in Soft Power: China’s Emerging 
Strategy in International Politics, ed. Mingjiang Li, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009): 52. 
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economic involvement can enhance its soft power by demonstrating its rising economic 
strength; Chinese companies in Saudi Arabia have reportedly granted scholarships to Saudi 
students studying in China.31 On the other hand, some Chinese businesses have engaged in 
selling low-quality, counterfeit products, damaging China’s image in the Arab World as 
well.32 
Given the enormous strategic importance of the Middle East and North Africa region, 
Sino-Arab educational ties have profound political implications for both sides. On the 
Chinese side, the main objective is to secure energy supply from the Middle East by 
deepening ties with Arab states. Until the early 1990s China had been self-sufficient in oil,33 
which explains its increasingly active engagement with the Middle East since then. In  
September 2013, China surpassed the U.S. and became world’s largest net oil importer,34 
with over 50% of its oil imports from the Middle East and one-fifth from Saudi Arabia 
alone.35 Establishing trusted relations with resource-rich states is crucial because China has 
no real strategic petroleum reserve, while the United States controls the sea lanes as well as 
many key oil suppliers.36 The Middle East and North Africa region has considerable potential 
for China’s growing need for markets as well. Despite the political turmoil that persists in 
large areas of the Middle East and North Africa, trade volume between China and Arab states 
has seen a stark rise from $25.5 billion in 2004 to $238.9 billion in 2013,37 and the two sides 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat, “China and Saudi Arabia: Strengthening Ties Through Education,” Daily 
Sabah, 13 Apr. 2014, web. 17 Nov. 2014, http://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/2014/04/14/china-and-saudi-
arabia-strengthening-ties-through-education. 
32 Yong Yu, “China’s Public Diplomacy to the Arab Countries: Overview, Evaluation and Suggestions,” trans. 
Siqi Gao, Journal of Liaoning University (Philosophy and Social Sciences), Vol. 42, No. 3 (May 2014). 1994-
2014 China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House. 
33 Ibid, 63. 
34 “China Is Now The World’s Largest Net Importer of Petroleum And Other Liquid Fuels,” U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 24 March 2014, http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=15531. 
35 “Countries: China,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, 4 Feb. 2014, 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/China/china.pdf. 
36 Erica S. Downs, “The Chinese Energy Security Debate,” The China Quarterly, Volume 177 (March 2004): 
21-41. 
37 Minghao Zhao, “China's Arab March,” CNBC, 26 June 2014, http://www.cnbc.com/id/101792181#. 
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anticipated a total trade volume of $300 billion in 2014.38 China is also the largest trading 
partner of a number of Arab countries including Yemen, Oman, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, 













Furthermore, winning favor from Arab states is crucial for China as it presents an 
alternative development model that potentially undermines the liberal democratic U.S. model. 
In cultivating closer ties with the Arab world, China also seeks to establish an array of states 
standing together against foreign intervention in domestic affairs. During the Syrian crisis, 
for example, China’s repeated vetoes at the UN Security Council gained it resentment across 
a number of Arab cities where Chinese flags were burnt. From the Chinese point of view, this 
demonstrated the Arab public’s lack of understanding of China’s non-interventionist foreign 
policy. Soft power thus became crucial to establishing a better Chinese image in the region. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Li Jing, “Sino-Arab Trade Forum Told of Trade Opportunities in Resurgent Middle East,” South China 
Morning Post, 14 September 2012, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1036235/sino-arab-trade-forum-
told-trade-opportunities-resurgent-middle-east. 
39 “Imports-Partners,”	  The World Factbook, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2061.html. 
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On the Arab side, feelings toward China today often resemble views of the United 
States a century ago – a time when much of the Middle East looked to the United States to rid 
them of European imperialism, when the United States was sending businesspeople instead of 
viceroys to the region.40 Now that many Arab countries pursue “Looking Eastward” policies, 
many have high expectations for China to counterbalance the United States in the region even 
as China carefully demonstrates that it has no intention to do so.41 According to results of the 
Annual Arab Opinion Survey by Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the 
University of Maryland, China was a more preferred global superpower than any other 
country on the list (Germany, Russia, France, Pakistan, United States, and Britain) between 












	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Alterman, “China’s Soft Power in the Middle East,” 70. 
41 Lirong Ma, “Zhong a wenming jiaowang mianlin de tiaozhan ji duice sikao” 中阿文明交往面临的挑战及对
策思考 [China-Arab States Civilization Exchanges: Challenges and Countermeasures]. Arab World Studies, 
March 2011, No.2, 16. 1994-2011 China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House. 
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fluctuated between 23% and 35%, while only 8% chose the United States in 2008 and 2009, 
and 7% in 2010 and 2011.42 43  
Educational exchange between China and the Arab World is still a relatively new 
phenomenon. Due to the stringent American immigration process and generally unfavorable 
attitudes toward U.S. policy in the region, many Arab students now look eastward to pursue 
higher education in China. As the Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll has shown, China was 
not traditionally a popular study abroad destination for many Arabs. Between 2008 and 2010, 
the percentage of Arabs who prefer to have family members studying in China actually 
decreased from 4% to 2%. However, the Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll was conducted in 
only 5 or 6 of the 22 Arab states with sample sizes of around 3,000 or 4,000 each year. Saudi 
Arabia was included in 2008 and 2010 but not in 2011, which might have biased the result. 











 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Shibley Telhami, “2010 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey,” Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and 
Development, University of Maryland. 
43 Shibley Telhami, “2011 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey,” Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and 
Development, University of Maryland.	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China’s Education Outreach to the Arab World 
Over the past 10 years, more than 1,000 Confucius Institutes have been established in 
105 countries and regions offering classes on Chinese language and culture, including 13 in 
the Arab World.44 In 2012, the number of Arab students in China exceeded 10,000, a 70% 
increase from the number in 2010,45 and the number has continued to increase at an average 
rate of 30 percent each year.46 In 2009, around 400 students from Saudi Arabia studied in 
Chinese universities;47 by 2013, the Saudi Ministry of Higher Education was sponsoring 
1,500 students studying in China.48 The China Scholarship Council (CSC) has also worked 
with a number of Arab universities and ministries, funding students from Iraq, Qatar, Yemen, 
Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Sudan to pursue higher education in China.49  
Arab students in China come through various channels. Some read about university 
programs in China on local newspapers and online such as the CSC (China Scholarship 
Council) website (en.csc.edu.cn/), while others heard about study opportunities from family 
members and friends who had studied or worked in China in the past.50 Confucius Institutes 
in Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan also have study abroad programs that sent students to China 
for various lengths of time. In addition, China now has at least one study abroad agency that 
recruits Arab students for a number of Chinese universities, run by a former student from 
Syria who now works in Hangzhou.51 The company, established almost a year and a half ago, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Yang Ai, “China and Arab countries to promote cooperation,” CCTV, 3 June 2014, 
http://english.cntv.cn/2014/06/03/VIDE1401770401959299.shtml. 
45 Ying Du, “Qunian alabo guojia zai zhongguo liuxuesheng da yiwan duo ren” 去年阿拉伯国家在中国留学生
达一万多人 [Last Year Arab Students in China Exceeded Ten Thousand], Science and Technology Daily, 16 
September 2013, http://digitalpaper.stdaily.com/http_www.kjrb.com/kjrb/html/2013-
09/16/content_224422.htm?div=-1. 
46 Ai, “China and Arab countries to promote cooperation.” 
47 “Alabo xuesheng laihua liuxue fangxingweiai” 阿拉伯学生来华留学方兴未艾 [Arab Students in China on 
the Rise], Xinhua, 10 July 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/society/2009-07/10/content_11688205.htm. 
48 Muhamad S. Olimat, China and the Middle East: From Silk road to Arab Spring, (London: Routledge, 2012), 
145. 
49 “China Scholarship Council Annual Report 2010,” China Scholarship Council. 
50 Information obtained from survey (see Chapter 2). 
51 Information obtained from conversation with a former Arab student who now works for the agency. 
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was the first of its kind in China.52 With agents based in the Dubai, the company recruited in 
the past year about 30 students from Syria, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Iraq, and parts of North 
Africa to study in China.53  
The low cost of Chinese university education is a main reason for many Arab students 
to study in China, especially since many of them receive Chinese government scholarships. 
While some scholarships are directly offered through universities in China, others are 
entrusted to governments of the students’ home countries. According to the CSC website, the 
amount of government scholarships varies across majors and degrees from CNY 59200 
(approx. USD 9655) to CNY 99800 (approx. USD 16277) per year, covering tuition, 
accommodation, daily living expenses, and medical insurance.54 Depending on the university  
 
 
*Source: China Scholarship Council. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 “Introduction to Chinese Government Scholarships,” China Scholarship Council, 
http://www.campuschina.org/scholarshipdetailen.aspx?cid=97&id=2070. 
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program, some scholarships are more competitive than others, but the scholarship standards 
are generally low in order to attract more students. As our survey in Chapter 2 will show, 
over half of the Arab students in our sample have received Chinese government funding 
during their stay in China. 
The long-term impacts of China’s higher educational programs for Arab students have 
yet to unfold. So far, there has been no attempt to monitor the impact of educational 
exchange programs on China’s image in the Arab World. In this research I hope to evaluate 
the effectiveness of educational exchange in enhancing China’s soft power rather than relying 
on previous literature to speculate what the effects of studying abroad in China may be. The 
survey in Chapter 2 examines whether the length of time Arab students spend in China has 
any impact on their perceptions of China. This question is relevant for policy makers 
considering how to make educational exchange as effective as possible in enhancing China’s 
soft power. The interviews in Chapter 3 offer some new insights on the individual 
experiences of several Arab students as well as implications for China’s soft power projection 
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Previous public opinion data in the Middle East are characterized by gaps and 
inadequacies. For example, the survey by Pew Research Center to generate the Middle 
Eastern part of “Global Image of the United States and China” included only five of the 22 
Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Tunisia), along with Israel and 
Turkey. Nor has there been any study that focused specifically on Arab students studying in 
China.  
To measure the impact of studying in China on Arab students’ perceptions of China, 
Sara Rathod and I did a quantitative study of our own. We generated a bi-lingual (English 
and Arabic) online survey consisting of 27 questions and collected responses from Arab 
students who had studied in China. Aside from multiple-choice questions, the survey also 
included several open-ended questions where respondents were given the freedom to answer 
in Arabic, English, or Chinese (see Appendix I). The survey was designed to show whether 
studying in China changes students’ perspectives of China and, specifically, whether the 
length of time spent in China affects their views in a way that could potentially enhance 
China’s soft power in the Arab World.  
We managed to reach some respondents through personal networking, while others 
were recruited through online chatting applications that are widely used in China. QQ, for 
example, allowed us to search for users by “hometown”. We typed in the name of different 
Arab countries, looked at random user profiles, contacted them to make sure they were Arab 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
∗ The following section is adapted from “China’s expansion of soft power in the Arab World through 
educational exchange,” a paper that I co-authored with Sara Rathod for a class project in 2014. 
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students in China, and asked them to do the survey. In addition, we also attempted to contact 
international student offices in a number of Chinese universities, but the attempt had been 
largely unsuccessful except in a medical university in Wuhan. The collection process started 
at the beginning of October 2014 and gathered 112 responses by early December. About 90% 
of the respondents were male and 10% were female. The age of the respondents ranged from 
19 to 40, with a mean age of 25.5 and a median age of 23. The length of time students had 
spent in China ranged from 0 (less than a month) to 192 months (16 years), with an average 
of 41 months (about 3 ½ years). However, since we were unable to access demographic 
information about the total population of Arab students studying in China, we could not know 
whether the sample respondents were representative of the whole population. To compensate, 
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we focused our efforts on gathering as large and diverse a sample as possible. As the survey 
results have shown, our 112 respondents came from 13 different Arab countries and studied 




We hypothesized that the more time Arab students spent in China, the greater China’s 
soft power would be among those students. Our measures of soft power included seven 
dimensions covering topics such as China’s overall image, foreign policy, development 
model, and education. The seven dimensions were then grouped into two categories: 
“government and foreign policy” and “non-government and foreign policy”, which I will 




Research consistently shows that students who participate in study abroad programs 
rate their host country higher after they return.55 The Atkinson study has specifically linked 
educational exchange programs in the United States to the spread of U.S. soft power abroad, 
although it did not account for the length of stay of the participants. Study abroad literature 
allows us to identify several possible mechanisms that may account for the increase in soft 
power. Because these mechanisms are intensified over time, we expect that soft power will 
also increase over time. 
More flexibility and openness—Zielinski defines flexibility and openness as “the 
willingness to be receptive and enjoy the opportunity of being exposed to different ways of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Atkinson, “Does Soft Power Matter? A Comparative Analysis of Student Exchange Programs 1980–2006,” 3. 
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thinking and behavior of another culture”56 She finds that students who studied abroad for 
longer periods of time exhibited greater flexibility and openness. The more flexible and open 
students are, the more receptive they should be to Chinese soft power. 
More likely to be influenced by Chinese policies — As mentioned earlier, Dwyer 
finds that students who studied abroad for a full year were more prone to achieving a greater 
understanding of their own cultural biases, developing a more sophisticated view of the world, 
and being influenced in their political and social views compared to their peers who only 
studied abroad for a semester. We expect that students studying abroad in China to have a 
better understanding of China’s domestic and foreign policies. This should lead to an increase 
in China’s “government and foreign policy”-related soft power. 
More likely to develop personal relationships with Chinese people—Dwyer finds that 
students who studied abroad were twice as likely to cultivate lifelong friendships with host-
country nationals. Developing close friendships will make an international student feel more 
personally attached to Chinese culture. This should lead to more warm feelings toward China 
in general, which inherently increases China’s soft power. The student may also be more 
likely to discuss a variety of issues with Chinese nationals, which could increase their 
understanding of the reasoning behind China’s policies. 
Greater understanding of Chinese language and culture—Lirong Ma, a Chinese 
scholar, states that the Arab public’s negative feelings about China may have been a result of 
a lack of information and understanding of cultural or political differences.57 As Arab 
students in China become more familiar with the Chinese language, culture, society, and 
values, they are likely to develop a better understanding of China’s domestic and foreign 
policy. Therefore, we can reasonably expect that as Arab students spend more time in China, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Zielinski, “Study Abroad Length of Program Influence on Cross-Cultural Adaptability”, 6. 
57 Ma, “China-Arab Civilization Exchanges: Challenges and Countermeasures,” 16.  
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 Our independent variable is the length of time the respondent has been in China, for 
which we used two different measurements. The first was an interval measure of the number 
of months the respondent has spent in China. The second is an ordinal variable in which the 
respondent was assigned to one of the following categories: one to three months, three to six 
months, six months to one year, one to two years, two to four years, four to eight years, and 
over eight years.  
Our dependent variable, China’s soft power, is measured using seven indicators, 
which were then split into two dimensions of soft power, and finally were scaled all together 
into one overall measure of soft power (See Appendix I for the survey questions).  The first 
three indicators—whether the respondent identified China as their preferred world 
superpower, whether the respondent considered China a sincere friend of their country, and 
whether the respondent said that China offers a model for progress for their home country—
were scaled together using the sum of their z-scores to measure the “government and 
foreign policy” dimension of China’s soft power. The remaining four indicators—the 
respondent’s current rating of China on a scale of one to ten, with ten being the most positive; 
the self-reported change in the respondent’s rating of China since before their arrival; 
whether the respondent selected China as their ideal place to study, and whether the 
respondent selected China as their ideal place to live—were scaled together using the sum of 
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their z-scores to measure the “non-government and foreign policy” dimension of China’s 
soft power.58 We then combined all the indicators into one measure of overall soft power. 
We started with our continuous measure of time spent in China. We first regressed 
time spent in China on the overall soft power scale using a bivariate OLS regression. We then 
broke the overall soft power into the two dimensions of soft power. Individually, we 
regressed time spent in China on the “government and foreign policy” soft power scale 
followed by the “non-government and foreign policy” soft power scale. Finally, we regressed 
time spent in China on all seven indicators of soft power individually. We used logistic 
regressions for the binary measures of soft power. 
Once we had run all ten bivariate regressions, we then introduced controls. First of all, 
we controlled for the geographic location of the respondent in China by classifying their 
location of study as either one of the “Big Four” cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and 
Tianjin) or not. Respondents living in big cities may feel more attracted by China’s economic 
progress and may enjoy a higher standard of living. This may lead them to feel positively 
toward China and may also encourage them to stay longer. We also controlled for their self-
reported initial rating of China—or “rating before”—because a person who started out with 
favorable feelings toward China would be more likely to commit to a longer stay and might 
also be more likely to demonstrate positive feelings about China in the survey. We controlled 
for whether the respondent has received funding from the Chinese government. Those who 
have been funded consistently may be able to study in China for a longer period of time 
without financial concerns, and they may also have more positive evaluations of China 
because of a sense of gratitude. We controlled for the respondents’ rating of the U.S. as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 We chose to split overall soft power into “government and foreign policy” and “non-government and foreign 
policy” based on the fact that Chinese scholars like Zhu Feng specifically associate soft power with 
receptiveness to a nation’s policies and strategic choices. Therefore, we thought it necessary to explore this 
particular dimension of soft power in some detail. Because our questions did not allow us to specifically 
measure Nye’s two other dimensions of soft power, culture and political values, we have chosen a more general 
category “non-government and foreign policy.” 
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measurement of their anti-American sentiment. If a respondent is strongly against anti-
American, he or she may choose to spend longer time in China instead of going to the U.S. to 
pursue further studies or find a job. Respondents who are anti-Western may also feel more 
favorably toward China as a powerful non-Western country and a symbol of the rising 
developing world. We controlled for the respondents’ self-reported language ability, because 
those who are comfortable speaking Chinese may also feel comfortable staying longer and 
will most likely feel more integrated into the local community. This will likely lead them to 
feel more positively toward China.  
 Finally, we controlled for the respondents’ home countries’ relations with China, 
using a scale that reflects five dimensions of China’s foreign relations with Arab states - oil, 
trade, arms sales, diplomacy, and culture.59 We found data on the amount of oil China 
imported from each of the Arab countries in 2013, the percentage that each country’s trade 
with China accounted for in its total foreign trade volume in 2013, the value of arms China 
exported to each state between 2002 and 2011, the number of diplomatic visits between each 










 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Olimat, China and the Middle East: From Silk Road to Arab Spring, 34. 
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country. These measures were then combined into one scale titled “closeness to China” (see 
Appendix II) by summing the z-scores of each variable. The more ties respondents’ home 
countries have with China, the more comfortable the respondents may feel staying in China 
longer and the more positively they may feel toward China. 
Once we ran all ten of our regressions, without controls and with controls, we 
repeated all the steps again with our ordinal measure of time spent in China. 
 
 
Regression Analysis Results 
Contrary to our prediction, our results conclusively demonstrated that the amount of 
time Arab students spent studying in China had no effect on China’s image among Arab  
students . In 39 out of the 40 regressions that we ran, time was not significant. Only one 
bivariate regression showed statistical significance: the ordinal measure of time spent in 
China on “ideal place to study” was significant at the α=.05 level with a coefficient of -0.06. 
However, time was no longer significant once 
controls were introduced. 
Therefore, using 40 separate analyses,  
we have ruled out the possibility that the  
amount of time the respondents had spent in  
China had any effect on their impressions of  
China. The four variables that seemed to have  
had the greatest effect on China’s soft power  
were the closeness to China of the students’  
countries-of-origin, the students’ ratings of the  
United States, whether they received funding  
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from the Chinese government, and their self- 
reported ratings of China before their first  
arrival. 
 Using the broadest scale of China’s  
overall soft power, the country-of-origin’s  
closeness to China had a positive effect  
(coefficient = .25/.25)60 that was significant at  
the α=.10 level. In other words, an increase of  
one point on the closeness to China scale led  
to an increase of about 0.25 on the soft power  
scale, which had a total range of 2.52. Putting  
this into perspective, the closeness to China scale had a total range of 1.644. We compared 
the scores of Egypt and Jordan, for example, both of which had no oil relations with China as 
well as similar levels of cultural and trade-related ties but differed markedly in their 
diplomatic and arms-related ties to China. From 2002 to 2011, Jordan imported $16 million 
worth of arms from China while Egypt imported $425 million. Between 2011 and 2014 
Jordan either hosted or participated in 8 official diplomatic exchanges with Chinese officials 
while Egypt engaged in 23 official visits with China. 
When soft power was broken up into two dimensions, closeness to China was only  
significant for the “non-government and foreign policy” scale. It had a positive effect 
(coefficient = .32/.32) that was statistically significant at α = .10 level. When each measure of 
soft power was tested individually, closeness to China showed a significant positive effect on 
three measures: whether the respondents chose China as their ideal place to study, whether 
they chose China as their ideal place to live, and whether they considered China a sincere 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 The first coefficient resulted from the regression in which time was measured as a continuous variable. The 
second is from the regression in which time was measured as a categorical variable. 
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friend of their countries. Taken together, the 
results suggested that China’s non- 
government-related soft power among Arab  
students is positively correlated with the  
closeness of their countries-of-origin to China.  
One explanation might be that, if China had  
good diplomatic relations with a respondent’s  
home country, the respondent would be more  
likely to have positive impressions of China  
in other aspects as well. 
The respondents’ rating of the U.S.  
had a significant effect on overall soft power  
when time was measured as a continuous  
variable. The effect was negative (coefficient  
= -0.03) and significant at α = .10 level,  
meaning that as ratings of the United States 
fell, China’s soft power rose. However, rating  
of the U.S. had no effect on overall soft  
power when time was measured categorically. 
When overall soft power was broken  
down into two dimensions, ratings of the U.S.  
only affected the “non-government and”  
foreign policy dimension of soft power. The  
effect was negative (coefficient = -.04/-.04)  
and significant at α =.10 level. This was true  
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using both measurements of time. When it  
came to the individual measure of soft power,  
ratings of the U.S. was only significant on  
two measures: whether the respondents chose  
China as their ideal place to study and  
whether they chose China as their ideal place  
to live. This suggests that studying abroad  
attractive to those students who have a  
negative and living in China is more feeling  
toward the United States. More generally,  
those who feel more negative toward the  
United States are more receptive to China’s 
“non-government and foreign policy” soft  
power. 
Funding had a significant effect on  
overall soft power only when time was  
measured as a continuous variable. The  
effect was positive (coefficient = .20) and  
significant at α =.10 level. However, funding  
had no effect on the overall soft power scale  
if time was measured categorically. When  
overall soft power was broken down into two  
dimensions, funding only affected the  
“government and foreign policy” dimension  
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of soft power. The effect was negative (coefficient = .26/.25) and significant at the α =.10 
level. This was true using both measurements of time. When each measure of soft power was 
tested individually, funding showed a significant positive effect only on the respondents’ 
current rating of China, which was not part of the “government and foreign policy” scale. 
Overall, it seems that receiving funding from the Chinese government made students more 
receptive to China’s “government and foreign policy” soft power; it also made them more 
prone to rating China highly. 
The students’ self-reported ratings of China before their study abroad experience 
had no effect on the overall soft power scale but had a significant effect on the “government 
and foreign policy” dimension of soft power. The effect was positive (coefficient =.08/.09) 
and had a significance of about α =.01. When each measure of soft power was tested 
individually, ratings before showed a significant positive effect on three measures: whether 
the respondents selected China as their ideal place to study, chose China as their preferred 
superpower, or believed that China provided a model for progress for their country. Results 
showed that the more positively students feel toward China before their travels, the more 
likely they were to want to study there, to choose China as their preferred superpower, or to 
say that China provided a model for progress. Their positive feelings toward China were most 
likely the reason why they chose to study in China in the first place. It is also likely that the 
students who rated China highly before their travel did so because they already felt that China 
would make a good superpower and admired China’s progress. Those feelings must have 
persisted after their arrival. 
Closeness to China, ratings of the U.S. and ratings of China before arrival were the 
only variables that had significant effects on the soft power scales. Interestingly, language 
ability had a negative effect on the change in a respondent’s rating of China and whether 
China provided a model for progress that could be useful for the respondent’s country. We 
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suspect that respondents with better Chinese language skills had a deeper understanding of 
the cultural and political differences between China and their own countries. Because of their 
greater ability to follow the news and interact with locals, they might have a deeper 
appreciation for the complexities of Chinese politics and economic growth and may therefore 
be more critical of China. On the other hand, it is also possible that this result simply 
stemmed from the inaccuracy of respondents’ self-reported language abilities. 
In light of the above quantitative analysis (see Appendix III for full regression results), 
which calls into question some of our earlier assumptions about the effect of educational 
exchange on soft power, the section below will discuss whether and how the experience of 





Overall Impressions of China 
Although time had no effect on the respondents’ impressions of China, we still have 
reasons to believe that studying in China can increase China’s soft power among Arab 
students. Respondents generally reported a positive change in their rating of China compared 
to before they traveled to China. Their rating of China before arrival was largely concentrated 
between 5 and 10, with an average score of 7.20, a median of 7, and a standard deviation of 
2.10. The graph was skewed to the left. After spending time in China, the respondents’ 
average rating of China increased to 8.20, with a median of 9 and a standard deviation of 1.90. 
The graph became even more strongly skewed to the left, with a striking 40 respondents 
rating China at 10. 
 












To understand why respondents reported an increase in their rating of China, our 
survey included open-ended questions asking the respondents to explain the reasons for their 
initial rating as well as the change in their rating after studying in China. Since both questions 
were optional, we have gathered 86 responses explaining the initial ratings and 65 explaining 
why their ratings changed after studying in China. We have noticed recurring themes while 
examining the answers to both of the open-ended questions. Among the 86 explanations of 
respondents’ initial ratings, we grouped 75 of them by themes, leaving out the other 11 that 
either did not fit into any of the common themes or were too ambiguous to be categorized. 
Similarly, we summarized all 65 responses by themes as well. 
Table 1 and 2 summarize the themes, the number of times each theme appears, and 
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Table 1 
What are the reasons for your rating of China  
before arriving there for the first time? * 
 
Reason for Rating Before Arrival Positive Negative Neutral Total 
Lack of information 2 2 9 13 
Chinese culture  7 1 2 10 
Chinese language 2 2 2 6 
Economic and social development 21 0 0 21 
Media 4 0 0 4 
Chinese People 7 0 0 7 
Stability and order 4 0 0 4 
Foreign relations 2 0 0 2 
Emotion and general favorability 8 0 0 8 
Total 57 5 13 75 
 
* This question is open-ended and optional, so we received 86 responses, 75 of which could fit into the common 
themes. Table 1 shows the times each theme appears in the respondents’ answers to the question. The columns 
denote whether a particular theme appears as a reason for the respondent’s positive (7-10), negative (1-4), or 
neutral (5-6) rating of China. 
 
 
China’s economic and social development was the most common reason given by 
respondents who gave China a positive initial rating. Among the 21 answers containing this 
theme, respondents expressed admiration for China’s economic development as well as 
presence of in their home countries as positive factors. Thirteen responses contained the 
theme “Lack of information,” where respondents claimed that either they could not access as 
much information about China as they might have liked in their home country or they simply 
had no knowledge about China whatsoever before coming to China. This makes educational 
programs for Arab students in China even more meaningful because they form their very first 
impression, if not their only impression, of China. Interestingly, 8 respondents expressed 
emotional attachment to China through comments such as “I love China.” While this might 
have resulted from their previous knowledge about China, we also suspect that the 
respondents’ ideas about the past were influenced by their attitudes at present. The friendly 
and hard-working image of the Chinese people appeared 7 times, all of which contributed to 
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more positive opinions of China amongst Arab students. Stability and order in China, which 
can be seen as part of the domestic government’s work, also shaped positive images of China. 
Good foreign relations between China and the respondents’ home countries contributed 
positively to the respondents’ ratings as well. China’s image in the media played a positive 
role, though we are not sure whether the respondents were referring to Chinese, Western, or 
Arab media. Notably, while Chinese culture was generally considered attractive, 3 out of 10 
responses containing this theme were either neutral or negative due to perceived cultural 
differences. 4 out of 6 answers that mentioned Chinese language were written in neutral or 
negative tones as well, as students feared that the difficult language would make their daily 
life in China difficult.  
Overall, China’s economic and social development, government, culture, and general 
attractiveness all contributed to its image in the minds of Arab students before their arrival in 
China, though the lack of information also demonstrates relative inadequacies in China’s 
efforts to promote its image in the Arab World. 
Table 2 is a compilation of recurring themes in the 63 answers we have received 
explaining why the respondents’ ratings changed after studying in China, if they changed at 
all. 19 respondents mentioned Chinese people as a major factor that increased their ratings of 
China, among which 16 reported an increase of their ratings of China as a result. While 
respondents were often impressed by the friendliness and diligence of the Chinese people, 3 
of them developed more negative views of China due to either racism they had encountered 
or the local people’s lack of understanding of other cultures. The theme of familiarity of life 
in China and social integration has appeared 10 times, among which 8 respondents gave 
higher ratings of China as a result of direct contact with Chinese society. Chinese culture and 
language together appear 10 times with a generally positive impact on the respondents’ 
feelings toward China, as respondents often reported greater interest in Chinese culture and  
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Table 2 
If your rating of China has changed after studying  
there, what are the reasons for this change? * 
 
Reason for Change in Rating Higher Lower Total 
Familiarity and social integration 8 2 10 
Chinese culture  4 0 4 
Chinese language 5 2 7 
Economic development and living standard 4 0 4 
Social environment in China 2 1 3 
Chinese people 16 3 19 
Stability and order 3 0 3 
Education and university life 4 4 8 
Scientific development 3 0 3 
Emotion and general favorability 5 0 5 
Total 54 11 65 
 
* This question is open-ended and optional, so we received 65 responses. Table 2 shows the times each theme 
appears in the respondents’ answers to the question. The columns denote whether a particular theme appears as 
a reason for the respondent’s higher or lower rating of China after studying there. 
 
 
life after they had mastered the language. Comfortable living standards, emotional attachment, 
and a safe and stable society also to shaped a positive image of China in the minds of Arab 
students. Rapid scientific development in China and the openness of Chinese society, which 
have been entirely absent in Table 1, appeared twice contributing to more positive feelings 
about China.   
However, the quality of education in China did not seem to have a particularly strong 
impact on Arab students’ views of China overall, and individual experiences of the education 
system in China differed widely. Only four respondents reported positive learning 
experiences, while four others complained about the lack of attention given to international 
students, low quality of classes, and the lack of understanding from university staff to 
accommodate their needs.  
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Comparison of Table 1 and Table 2 leads to a tentative conclusion that three factors 
might have been most important in prompting respondents to give higher ratings of China 
after studying there. First, familiarity with the Chinese society and social integration seemed 
to have played a crucial roles in filling the information vacuum, turning neutral attitudes into 
positive ones. Second, increased understanding of Chinese people among the Arab students 
had a positive impact on the respondents’ feelings about China, though some experienced 
occasional cultural differences and conflicts as well. Third, the fear of learning Chinese 
language could be mitigated after the respondents studied in China and became more 
comfortable using the language, which also made China’s traditional and contemporary 
culture more accessible.  
 
 
Survey Results and Public Opinion: A Comparison 
A comparison between our survey results and previous opinion polls in the Arab 
World yields some interesting findings. While our respondents views on certain topics 
differed from views of the Arab public as previous polls suggested, the results remained 
consistent in other areas. Generally speaking, Arab students who had studied in China 
appeared more likely to choose China as the preferred superpower, place to study, and place 
to live compared to other world powers. They were also more likely to favor China’s foreign 
policy toward their home countries, perhaps as a result of increased exposure to Chinese 
official media and familiarity with Chinese endeavors in the Arab World.   
When asked about their ideal study abroad destination, 38% of our survey respondents chose 
China, which was much higher than what the Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll would 
suggest. Only 3% of our survey respondents picked France, while over 30% of the polltakers 
said France was the most preferred study abroad destination. Interestingly, there was not 
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much difference in the data concerning Germany, Britain, Russia, and the United States. 
Since we do not know for sure what the results would be if we surveyed Arab students who 
had never studied in China, it is difficult to single out the effect of the respondents’ 
experience in China. The difference in question wording might have played a role as well. 
That said, over 60% of our survey respondents preferred to study in a country other than 
China if they could, which might be an indication that Chinese university programs still need 
improvement. Still, Arab students who have spent time studying in China are generally more 
likely to appreciate their Chinese educational experience than the public back in their home 
countries. They may spread the positive impressions and encourage future Arab students to 
study in China. 
 
 
                Ideally, if you could study in any of the  
               following countries, where would you go? 
                                                                                                                                   _________________________________________________________ 
        France          3           
          
China    38        
         
Germany             22     
 
        Britain          12 
 
        Russia                 1 
 
        United States                 24 
 
 
Results from our survey Q18. 
 
 
When asked about their ideal place to live, almost half of our survey respondents 
chose China. This again implied that education might not be the primary reason for many 
Arab students to view China positively, though their university experience certainly helped 
them prepare for future career and social life in China if they wanted to stay. While public 
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opinion polls suggested that France was the most popular place to live in the minds of the 
Arab public, it only received 5% of the votes in our survey. Understandably, Arab students 
from French-speaking countries took up a smaller portion in our sample (about 10%) than in 
the Annual Arab Public Opinion poll (approximately one-fifth of the poll takers). 
Furthermore, our survey respondents were exposed to Chinese culture and society for 
different periods of time, and most of them had at least some knowledge of Chinese language. 
Perhaps for that reason, Chinese society was less foreign and more amiable in the eyes of 
Arab students who had studied in China.  
 
 
          Ideally, if you could live in any of the  
        following countries, where would you go? 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  France     5 
  
  China    49 
 
  Germany       16 
 
  Britain     10 
 
  Russia    2 
  
  United States       18 
 
 
  Results from our survey Q19. 
 
If there was only one superpower in the world, 40% of our survey respondents and 
around one-fourth of the Arab public preferred China to be the superpower. Both results 
suggest the shared disillusionment with Western powers among Arab students and public, 
while China’s foreign polices and diplomatic gestures were relatively well received in the 
Arab World. Notably, this was the only question in which China topped all the other 
countries on the list in the Arab Public Opinion Poll, which might be an indication that 
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foreign policy shaped China’s image in the Arab World more than Chinese culture, 
education, or society. Our survey question replaced Pakistan with Saudi Arabia, a more 
influential regional power with strong religious significance. 15% of our respondents chose 
Saudi Arabia as their preferred superpower. In addition, we also added “Other” as an option 
where respondents could fill in countries that were not listed. Most respondents who chose 
“Other” simply wrote down their home countries, though several respondents stated that they 
did not want any superpower in the world. 
 
                 If there is only one superpower in the world,  
    which country do you want it to be? 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
China              40 
 
Germany              6 
 
Russia               3 
 
France               2 
 
         Saudi Arabia     15 
 
United States      4 
 
Britain               3 
 
Other         27 
 
Results from our survey Q17. 
 
Lastly, our survey asked respondents whether they thought China was a sincere friend 
of their home countries. They were given the options of “Yes, China is a sincere friend of my 
country” “Not really, China does good things only for its own interest” “No, China is not a 
friend of my country” and “Don’t know”. 60% of the respondents believed that China was a 
sincere friend of their countries, while 25% said that China did good things for its own 
benefits. Not a single respondent said that China was not a friend. The overwhelming positive 
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impression of China’s foreign policy stood in stark contrast to the largely neutral attitude 
toward China in the Middle East. According to surveys conducted by Pew Research Center in 
2013, around half of the Tunisians and Jordanians saw China as a partner, while only about 
30% of the Lebanese, Egyptians, and Palestinians believed the same. Much of the Middle 
East was suspicions of China’s intentions or ambivalent. When asked whether China 
considered the interest of those countries, most of the respondents said no. Many factors 
might have contributed to the positive attitude among Arab students in China. Familiarity 
with Chinese language and society might make them more receptive to Chinese media and 
propaganda, which often failed to reach or resonate with foreign audience. It is also possible 
that their favorability toward Chinese foreign policies had formed before they arrived in 
China. In any case, our survey results have consistently shown that economic development 
and foreign policies are the main reasons for many Arab students to have  
positive feelings toward China. Familiarity and social integration comes second, making 
China the ideal place to live for almost half of our respondents. Education seems to be a less 
significant factor in shaping the respondents’ impressions, but it certainly provides an 
opportunity for many Arab students to spend time in China, which in turn can enhance 










Results from our survey Q14. 











 We have reason to believe that higher educational programs for Arab students in 
China can increase China’s soft power. However, the increase seems to have little to do with 
the students’ length of stay or the educational experience, but more with increased 
understanding of Chinese people, language and culture. The respondents’ initial feelings 
toward China, their impressions of the United States, whether they receive funding from the 
Chinese government, and their home countries’ relationship with China also significantly 
determine their willingness to receive China’s soft power. 
The reason why time spent studying in China had no effect might be the great 
variation in the lengths of time that respondents reported. We suspect that the greatest gains 
in soft power occur in the first few months/years, after which time no longer has any effect 
on soft power. Previous research into study abroad rarely measured the effects of programs 
that last longer than a year, and future researchers may wish to investigate further the ideal 
length of stay to achieve maximal soft power benefits. 
There are several limitations to our research. First, we have no control group of Arab 
students who have never studied abroad in China. This introduces difficulties in assessing 
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whether educational exchange increases China’s soft power amongst Arab students studying 
in China relative to Arab students who haven’t study abroad in China. While our survey asks 
respondents to recall their feelings about China before studying there, their answers may as 
well have be subjectively influenced by their current opinions. Future researchers may 
improve our process by identifying Arab students who plan to study abroad in China, asking 
them to fill out the survey once before they travel to China and again when they return home 
or obtain their degree, whichever occurs first.  
Second, some respondents had finished their studies a long time ago, but the time they 
had spent in China after graduation was not taken into account in our survey. Since most of 
our respondents were living in China at the time of the survey, we do not know if the students’ 
feelings toward China change once they leave the country. Some Arab students hope to stay 
in China after finishing their studies, while others plan to return home. To find out which 
group plays a bigger role in enhancing China’s soft power, we would need to track the lives 
of these two groups in the long run. 
Third, since we did not have access to demographic information about the total 
population of Arab students studying in China, we do not know if our survey sample is 
representative. This leads to problems of descriptive inference. In our small sample, about 90 
percent of our respondents were male and almost half were from Yemen. It is possible that 
these groups were overrepresented in our survey; it is also possible that they were not.  
Lastly, the role of university education in shaping the respondents’ feelings toward 
China remains unclear. Since the open-ended questions did not provide conclusive answers to 
this concern, it might as well be spending time in China in general that changed Arab 
students’ perceptions rather than education specifically. Nevertheless, we can safely assume 
that educational opportunities allow more Arab students to spend time studying in living in 
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China, which in itself can contribute to improving China’s image and influence in the Arab 
World. 
Our survey analysis suggests that educational exchange can play an important role in 
bridging the gap between the Arab World and China and facilitates the projection of Chinese 
soft power. As stated previously, if the Chinese government’s primary aim is to increase its 
soft power in the Arab World, increasing the length of time students spend in China may not 
be the most effective means to do so. Instead, it should consider expanding opportunities for 
more Arab students to study in China, improving the quality of university education, and 
offering career opportunities for the students in order to turn their positive views of China 
into concrete actions that benefit Sino-Arab relations in the long run. This is not to say, 
however, that the Chinese government should only fund students to stay for a short period of 
time. While our survey focused on Arab students’ university experience, some respondents 
nevertheless wrote about their willingness to stay in China after graduation and the difficulty 
of doing so.  
Our survey did not make any connections between China’s positive image and its soft 
power, which I will discuss more extensively in the next chapter. After all, soft power is only 
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 In order to better understand and explain the survey results, I conducted a series of 
interviews with Arab students in China as a complement of the quantitative analysis. 
According to the Arab students who helped me distribute the survey, the process of 
distribution was not always smooth, as some participants were skeptical of the motives 
behind my survey due to the questions asking for their political opinions. Despite efforts to 
guarantee the anonymity of respondents (written at the beginning of the survey and 
reemphasized by those who helped with distribution), many still feared that taking the survey 
could make their devices traced and their identities exposed, but some of them expressed 
willingness to speak to me personally about their experiences in China on the bases of 
anonymity.61  
The interviews were formulated to supplement the survey. While quantitative analysis 
of the survey indicates that studying in China has a positive impact on Arab students’ 
attitudes toward China, the open-ended questions in the survey cannot provide a solid ground 
for qualitative analysis. Three reasons may explain this concern: first, since all the open-
ended questions are optional, almost half of the respondents chose to skip them; among 
respondents who typed in their answers, a vast majority simply jotted down a few words and 
did not elaborate. Second, two of the three open ended questions ask respondents to explain 
their ratings of China before and after their studies there, which targets the respondents’ 
overall impressions of China and leaves out important details. For example, if respondents 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Feedbacks from Arab students who helped distribute my survey. 
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rated China high after studying in Chinese universities, they might only explain the good 
impressions while leaving out the negative experiences that they might have had. In terms of 
how to improve future Arab students’ experiences in China, respondents generally focused on 
government policies due to the way the question was formulated, though there might be other 
indirect yet important things to consider such as social and cultural factors. Third, some 
respondents might be hesitant to write about certain experiences in a survey out of political 
and personal concerns. While students might still have reservations during interviews, 
personal conversation with the interviewer generally could help them feel more comfortable 
expressing their true feelings. In fact, once the interviewees were convinced that I was a 
student studying abroad like themselves, and that this research stemmed from my interest in 




I selected sample interviewees from Arab students who had provided me with their 
contact information previously (phone number, WeChat ID, or QQ number). While they 
might or might not have taken the survey, all of them expressed willingness to be contacted 
in later stages of my research. Among the 35 contacts in total, I selected 10 interviewees from 
countries that were relatively heavily represented in the survey. Based on the number of 
contacts I had from each country, I hoped to interview two students from Yemen, Syria, and 
Egypt, as well as one student from Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, and Morocco. Since I had 
little background information about these students except their home countries, the selection 
of interviewees from each country was largely random. This small sample was not meant to 
represent the whole Arab student body in China, but it aimed to provide a more well-rounded 
understanding of individual Arab student experiences. By tracing each student’s personal, 
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academic, and career development path, I intended to examine the potential significance of 
Chinese higher education for Arab students in shaping future Sino-Arab relations. 
I managed to interview 8 of the selected students. One of the two selected Egyptian 
students denied my interview request, while the selected Saudi student never responded to 
my message. All of the eight interviewees were male, which was not surprising given that 
almost 90% of our survey respondents were male. Their ages ranged between 20 and 41, and 
the average age was 27.1 years old. The average time spent in China was 2.8 years, though 
the time varied greatly for each individual. One of the Yemeni interviewees had spent five 
years in China, while the Egyptian interviewee had only been in China for a week. The 
interviewees were located in six different cities across China (Changsha, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou, Wuhan, Chengdu, and Changzhou) except the interviewee from Morocco, who 
was doing an internship in Bahrain at the time of our phone interview. Shanghai and 
Guangzhou are two of the Chinese biggest metropolitans; Changsha and Wuhan are major 
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Background Information of Interviewees 62 







Student 1 41 Sudan 2 years Changsha Computer Science Doctor 
Student 2 23 Yemen 3 years Changsha Industrial Engineering Bachelor 
Student 3 29 Tunisia 3.5 years Shanghai Linguistics Doctor 
Student 4 22 Syria 3.5 years Guangzhou Clinical Medicine Bachelor 
Student 5 20 Egypt 1 week Wuhan Chinese Language 
Bachelor 
(semester) 
Student 6 27 Syria 4 years Chengdu Software Engineering Bachelor 
Student 7 28 Yemen 5 years Changzhou Mechantronic Engineering Master 
Student 8 27 Morocco 1.5 years Shanghai Finance Master 
 
 
interviewees were doing PhD programs; two were in Master’s programs; the rest were doing 
undergraduate studies, though one of them was in China for a semester-long language 
program only. They majored in 8 different fields including Computer Science, Industrial 
Engineering, Linguistics, Clinical Medicine, Chinese Language, Software Engineering, 




In order to maintain confidentiality and protect interviewee identities, I did not ask for 
the students’ full names or any personal information that might make them identifiable. Two 
of the interviews were conducted in person and two on the phone, while the rest were done 
through texting on WeChat or QQ. During the in-person and phone interviews, I typed down 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Information from interviews. 
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notes on my laptop and named the files as numbers. In cases of online interviews where 
questions and answers were both typed, I saved the texts and numbered the files as well. 
The length of my interviews varied, lasting from less than twenty minutes to almost an 
hour. Online interviews generally took more time because both questions and answers must 
be typed, while in-person and phone interviews tended to be shorter. The length of each 
interview also depended on the enthusiasm of the interviewee, since some students were 
more talkative than others. My questions were more or less the same for all my interviewees. 
Aside from basic information such as age and fields of study, I formulated my questions to 
cover three main topics: 1) impressions about China, 2) student life in China, and 3) future 
development of Arab students in China. 
 
 
Impressions of China 
I asked each of my interviewees to describe his impressions of China before the first 
visit. In the survey, respondents were asked to rate their feelings about China and explain the 
ratings, but such wording tended to direct respondents toward a single direction. If they rated 
China positively overall, for example, they might only provide reasons for the positive views, 
though their impressions of China could as well be a mixture of positive and negative 
feelings. Therefore, I formed my interview question in a relatively neutral tone without the 
positive / negative binary, hoping to get a more comprehensive idea of China’s image in the 
minds of my interviewees before their first visits. 
China’s economic development and growing trade with the interviewees’ home 
countries were the most prominent factor in shaping their initial feelings about China, as 
mentioned by Student 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6. According to Student 4, his father had been doing 
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business in China for a long time and recommended that he travel to China for study as well. 
“China’s economic development makes everyone want to settle in China,” said Student 6.  
The second most important factor was language. Both Student 2 and Student 4 
mentioned the increasing importance of Chinese language in global trade, yet Chinese 
speakers were still rare in their home countries. Student 5, having spent a year and a half at a 
Confucius Institute in Egypt, claimed that his semester in China was dedicated solely to 
improving language skills.  
China’s domestic and foreign policies also influenced the initial impressions of some of 
my interviewees. Student 7 said that he had “learned some Chinese history at school because 
of the good relations between China and my home country”. Student 6, well-acquainted with 
Chinese culture through the Confucius Institute, believed that the people of China were 
similar to the people of Egypt. In addition, Student 1 and 2 mentioned China’s large 
population, while Student 7 knew of China’s one-child policy. Student 3 aspired to job 
opportunities and better living conditions in China, calling China a “good and successful 
country”. 
All the interviewees expressed either positive or neutral initial feelings toward China 
except Student 8, who used to believe that people in China were so strange that they would 
eat every living thing. “I wasn’t the only one thinking this way,” he said with a laugh, “many 
people around me believed it too and couldn’t understand why I wanted to study in China.” 
He concluded that the alienness of Chinese culture and the lack of information contributed to 
China’s blurry image in the minds of many Moroccans. “So why did you choose China?” I 
asked. “It was a combination of choice and destiny,” he said. “I applied for master programs 
in China, Japan, and Korea, but my university in Shanghai was the only one that gave me 
scholarships.”  
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I proceeded to ask whether the interviewees’ impressions of China changed after they 
had spent time studying in China. Regardless of their initial impressions, all of the eight 
interviewees expressed more positive overall feelings about China except Student 4 and 5, 
who claimed that their impressions did not change.  
Chinese people and culture played significant roles in shaping the interviewees’ current 
impressions of China, though some viewed these factors positively and others negatively. 
Student 2 said that people in China were extremely helpful, while Student 8 found that 
Chinese people were similar to Moroccans in that they both valued family and friendship. 
However, Student 3 was disappointed because he found the people not as “civilized” as he 
had expected, an impression further worsened by rampant environmental problems and food 
scandals in China. Student 7 was saddened by China’s social problems such as the increasing 
divorce rates, separation between married couples, and left-behind children.  
The interviewees’ opinions on Chinese culture were divided as well. Both Student 7 
and Student 8 were intrigued by traditional Chinese culture, and Student 7’s experience in 
various cities allowed him to understand the stark difference between northern and southern 
cultures in China. However, Student 6 found “no more traditional culture in China”, which 
led him to conclude that China should revisit its roots more frequently instead of blindly 
accepting Western cultural influence that came with economic opening up.  
Some interviewees also believed that spending time in China helped to counter the 
stereotype that China could only make low-quality products. Student 1 reported that, as he 
gained more knowledge and better understanding of China, he was able to observe the “real 
China” instead of merely seeing China through bad products. According to Student 8, the 
quality of goods make in China depends on their prices. “Sometimes people only think of the 
cheap products made in China, but iPhones are also made in China. If you are willing to pay 
more, you can find good products made in China too,” he said. 
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Overall, after gaining more comprehensive ideas about China’s goods and bads, all of 
the eight interviewees reported either more positive or unchanged impressions about China. 
Despite the various social and cultural problems pointed out by Student 2 and 6, Student 2 
continued to view China as a successful country and a safe place to live. “I love this country 




Student Life in China 
I asked my interviewees several specific questions regarding their educational 
experience in Chinese universities. While the survey results did show a positive change in the 
respondents’ attitude toward China after spending time there, it said little about whether this 
change was a result of their university life or spending time in China in general. This section 
was designed to further explore the university life of my interviewees. 
I started with a broad question: “How is your university in China?” The answers I 
received were extremely diverse, ranging from “Not interesting” “ok” to “super good”. The 
most common complaint was inadequate quality of teachers, as Student 1, 4, 6, and 7 all 
mentioned communication problems with their teachers. Chinese teachers often spoke poor 
English even though it was the language of instruction for international students, which was 
especially problematic for Student 1 and 4 whose Chinese levels were relatively basic. 
Discrimination was another problem, as Student 6 reported that “Some teachers were not 
understanding.” Not only did teacher laugh at him during class for not being able to 
understand a question in Chinese, but the teacher also prompted other students to laugh with 
him by saying, “We Chinese are better than foreigners.” Student 4, who had been taking 
courses in English, said that his classmates were not friendly and that his interest in class 
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diminished as a result. Student 7 said that Chinese and international students were both very 
helpful. 
Universities across China often had insensitive policies (or the lack thereof) on how to 
accommodate international students with extremely different academic backgrounds from 
that of Chinese students. Math in Chinese universities was especially hard, which often 
caused interviewees to retake final exams and sometimes entire classes. Student 6 said that he 
had taken a math final exam 4 times and still couldn’t pass. Student 4 complained that 
international students had to wait for a whole year to retake a failed final exam, while 
Chinese students at his university only needed to wait for a few weeks to do so. The exam 
system in Chinese universities also posed challenges for some interviewees. Student 4 said 
that he was not used to the question formats in exams, while Student 3 complained that his 
classes tended to focus on grades more than the learning process. According to Student 8, 
classes were difficult at first because he came from the French university system in Morocco 
while China’s system was more similar to that in the US, though he eventually grew 
accustomed to it. 
I continued to ask whether the office for international students in each university was 
helpful for each interviewee in various aspects of their lives. The office usually helps 
international students adjust to life in China when they first arrive, supervises their studies 
and other activities, keeps track of their travel documents, and solves their grievances when 
needed, though the office’s specific roles may vary across different universities. Student 2, 6, 
and 7 said that the office was helpful in almost everything, while Student 1 and 4 said that the 
office was helpful “sometimes” “to an extent.” According to Student 3, the relationship 
between international students and the office depends on the particular students and the 
teachers working there. Some teachers were more helpful than others, while some students 
were more cooperative than others. To solve this problem, he suggested that Chinese 
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universities raise their standards for admission so as to avoid future trouble for the office 
when dealing with unqualified students. 
Finally, since I was unable to find data on the number of Arab students studying in 
China or number of students from each country, I decided to ask my interviewees whether 
they had any idea about the number of students from their countries who were studying in 
China. The most common answer I received was that there were a lot but they were not sure 
how many exactly. In many cases, students from particular countries tend to concentrate in 
the same university perhaps because those who arrived first advised the latecomers to choose 
the same school. However, some of the interviewees were one of the few, if not the only, 
student from a particular country in the whole university. Student 6 said that his university in 
Chengdu had around 50 Arab students from several different countries. Student 7, who 
recently began his graduate studies, said that there were over 50 Arab students in his 
university doing undergraduate programs and that he was the only Arab student studying for 
a Master’s degree there. Student 5 reported that 30 students came to China this year from the 
Confucius Institute where he studied, and the same programs took place regularly. According 
to Student 8, his university had 40 Arab students, and there were about 100 Moroccans in 
Shanghai studying and doing businesses. 
 
 
Personal Development and Sino-Arab Relations 
The third section of my interview focused on drawing a connection between the 
interviewees’ experiences and China’s soft power. After all, the positive image of China in 
the minds of Arab students cannot be meaningful unless it leads to stronger Sino-Arab 
relationship. I framed my questions in two parts: 1) How is the relationship between China 
and your home country? 2) How does your experience of studying in China contribute to 
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your personal development? Through the first question, I hoped to see whether the 
interviewees were interested in or at least aware of the implications of their presence as 
unique components in Sino-Arab relations. As for the second question, I wanted to see if 
higher education in China had a positive impact on their future development, and their 
aspirations and careers could potentially increase China’s soft power projection in the Arab 
World. 
All 8 interviewees reported some sort of good relations between China and their home 
countries, with trade and diplomatic ties featuring most prominently in their answers. This 
might explain why most our survey respondents considered China a sincere friend of their 
home countries. According to Student 2, “Yemen was the first Arab country to recognize the 
PRC, and the good relations have continued to this day. There are many Chinese companies 
in Yemen, while China’s economic development provides plenty of trade opportunities. 
People in Yemen are curious about China.” Student 7 not only mentioned Yemen’s extensive 
trade relations with China, but he also talked about China’s Friendship Bridge project in 
Sana’a, which brought about the first overpass in Yemen. Both Student 4 and Student 6 
commented that the relationship between China and Syria was friendly and strong, making no 
mention of China’s vetoes during the Syrian Crisis that stirred up controversy across the Arab 
World. Similarly, Student 5 said that the relationship between China and Egypt was “super 
strong”, and that the Egyptian President Sisi had recently visited China. Student 1 reported 
that Sudan had many Chinese companies working in the communication sector as well as the 
oil industry. According to Student 3, China’s relationship with Tunisia was good especially in 
terms of trade. “Chinese products were increasingly welcomed in Tunisia, but there needs to 
be more cultural communications because people on both sides don't understand each other,” 
he said. Student 8, however, presented a somewhat different image perhaps because Morocco 
had relatively little Chinese influence compared to other countries in the whole Arab World. 
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He said that many Moroccans came to know China through trade, which often meant bad-
quality products. However, 2 Confucius Institutes had been established in Rabat and 
Casablanca, and several Chinese acupuncture doctors had been working for years a local 
hospital near his home.  
Notably, the interviewees’ opinions on their home countries’ relationship with China 
did not always reflect the countries’ closeness to China (see Appendix II) discussed in 
Chapter 2. The interviewees from Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, and Morocco gave responses that 
were generally consistent with results from the table (Egypt 0.992, Sudan 1.091, Yemen 
0.107, Morocco -0.057), but interviewees from Syria and Tunisia held much more positive 
views of their countries’ relationship with China than what the table had suggested (Syria -
0.553, Tunisia -0.349). Therefore, countries’ “closeness to China” does not translate perfectly 
into individual opinions of their countries’ relations with China. It is also possible that the 
self-selected interviewees are better receivers of China’s soft power compared to the rest of 
the population in their home countries. 
I asked about the interviewees’ career plans and how their experiences in Chinese 
universities could contribute to their future development. Regardless of their current majors, 
trade seemed to be a common career direction that most of the interviewees shared. Moreover, 
the Chinese language skills that the interviewees had acquired would also be a crucial part of 
their future career. Student 2 said that he hoped to work in either China or Saudi Arabia 
where his Chinese language skills could be crucial for future Sino-Arab trade. Similarly, 
Student 3 hoped to work in China for a few years doing business before going back to 
Tunisia, and Student 4 said that he hoped to work in trade between China and Syria. Both 
Student 6 and Student 7 wanted to settle in China; Student 6 wanted to find a marketing job, 
while Student 7 hoped to introduce Chinese products to Arab retailers and consumers. 
Student 1, on the other hand, said that he would go back to Sudan and become a teacher. “I 
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will bring back ideas that I have gained China, which can be useful for future relations 
between China and Sudan,” he said. Student 6, who was on a semester program for Chinese 
language, said that he wanted to go back to Egypt and become a translator or join businesses. 
Student 8, who was doing an internship in Bahrain at the time of our phone interview, said 
that he wanted to work in China initially but was offered an internship opportunity in Bahrain. 
He hoped to work for a few more years in Bahrain before going back to Morocco or trying 
somewhere else.  
Apart from career plans, Student 1, 2 and 3 said that studying in China opened up their 
minds to new people and new ideas. Student 4 believed that China had more learning 
opportunities and a better outlook for personal development in general. Student 8, reflecting 
on his initial hesitance before going to China, said that studying in China allowed him to gain 
Chinese language skills, friendship, as well as understanding of Chinese society, economic 
system, and education. “I have no regrets,” he said. “Students like us can become the bridge 
between China and Arab states.” China’s stable political environment and economic 
development were two main attractions for interviewees who wanted to settle down, 
especially those from politically turbulent countries. All of the interviewees expressed hopes 





The interviews offered unique insights into the life of individual Arab students in China, 
providing possible explanations for Arab students’ improved attitudes toward China after 
studying there. They also suggested some linkages between Chinese higher education for 
Arab students and China’s soft power in the Arab World. 
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The interviewees’ positive feelings about China stemmed from various sources that 
might or might not include their university experiences. Looking back at the theory, I found 
that all four mechanisms from past research remained valid explanations for the interviewees’ 
more positive feelings about China. First, consistent with Zielinski’s argument, studying in 
China led to more openness of mind as Arab students were exposed to different cultures and 
ways of thinking (Student 1, 2, and 4). Second, Dwyer suggested that students studying 
abroad were likely to change their political value might be true as well, since some 
interviewees were indeed very receptive of China’s policies such as the prioritizing domestic 
stability and non-interventionist foreign policies (Student 3 and 6). However, it remains 
uncertain whether their political opinions took shape during their stay in China, or whether 
their already formed views of Chinese policies partially led to their initial decision to study 
there. Third, Dwyer’s argument that students studying abroad were likely to cultivate 
friendship with people in the host countries also held true. Some interviewees developed 
strong, close personal relationships with people in China (and intend to marry Chinese 
citizens), which contributed enormously to their positive impressions of the country and 
willingness to settle down (Student 2, 6, and 8). Lastly, regardless of their previous 
knowledge about China, all the interviewees demonstrated good understanding of Chinese 
culture, society, and at least some knowledge of Chinese language. First-hand experience of 
living in China helped to dispel some of the interviewees’ previous negative impressions 
caused by lack of understanding (Student 1 and 8), as Lirong Ma suggested. 
The interviews also shed light on how the individual experiences of Arab students 
might influence future Sino-Arab relations. As early as the 1990s, Mustafa Saphariny, the 
first international student to receive a PhD in international relations in Peking University, 
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served as the Palestinian ambassador to China.63 The interviewees’ prospective career fields 
include education, business, translation, and finance, all of which can be useful for China to 
project its soft power in the Arab World wherever they choose to pursue their careers. For 
students who plan to return home, their Chinese experience is a rare asset as Sino-Arab trade 
and diplomatic relations deepen with time. Through various means such as teaching and 
translating, these students will be able to convey their understanding of Chinese society and 
culture to people around them, helping to dispel common misunderstandings of China among 
the Arab public. In contrast, Arab students who choose to stay in China may have a hard time 
competing with their Chinese counterparts in job-hunting, since they are still a relatively new 
phenomenon. However, the Arab communities in China have established their own career 
networks where students find part time or full time jobs with other Arab businessmen and, 
over time, some of them become independent businessmen themselves. Compared with Arab 
businessmen who have not studied in Chinese universities, these students have a longer time 
of language and cultural immersion, and their major fields at university may be related to the 
particular goods and services that they work with. The success of Arab students today will 
become crucial examples and connections for future comers, making China an alternative 
destination that is more accessible than many western countries for study, work, and life.  
University experience in China had little influence on the interviewees’ overall 
impressions of China. Interestingly, when asked about their views of China, none of the 
interviewees mentioned their experiences in Chinese universities. When asked about the 
difficulties of living in China, however, interviewees often began to complain about the 
various problems they had encountered at university. Considering China’s relatively short 
history in hosting large numbers of foreign students, governments and universities still have a 	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使 [Mustafa Saphariny: From an International Student at Peking University to Ambassador to China], 
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long way to go before they can accommodate the academic, social, and personal needs of 
increasingly numbers of Arab students. For example, teachers whose language of instruction 
is English often have quality issues; cultural and racial awareness remains weak on campus 
and elsewhere; governments and universities have yet to develop career services for 
international students or assistance for their long-term stay in China. As a result of limited 
career options, many Arab students, regardless of their majors, graduate from Chinese 
universities to make a living in China by doing international trade. Immigration issues remain 
a headache for many, as some resort to marrying Chinese nationals in order to gain 
permanent residency. For many Arab students, life in China does not end with graduation 
from universities, but their limited career choices may directly affect how China’s soft power 
can be projected. Given that many Arab students intend to settle in the country, China needs 
to have a legalized, systematic immigration process and open up job opportunities in different 
fields for foreign graduates from Chinese universities – a far more complicated issue than 
education itself. 
Lastly, I realize that the small, self-selected interviewee sample had some inherent bias, 
as respondents with negative thoughts about China or their personal experiences might 
refrain from participating in interviews. Almost all interviewees expressed at least some 
degree of interest in the relationship between China and their home countries. The 
interviewees also expressed hope of deepening Sino-Arab ties in the future, though the 
significance of their individual contribution remains to be seen. I wonder if the same 
awareness of international affairs could be found in other Arab students in China as well, but 
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Survey results and interviews both indicate that China can increase its soft power 
through university programs for Arab students. The majority of our survey respondents have 
developed more positive feelings about China despite the difficulties encountered by many of 
them academically and socially. Regardless of the length of time students spend studying in 
China, this first-hand experience can increase their understanding of Chinese language, 
culture, people, and society in ways that otherwise would not be possible. 
However, changing feelings toward China seem to be the result of spending time in 
China in general. For many Arab students, academic experience in Chinese universities either 
does not contribute significantly to their impressions or in some cases even damages the 
image of China. Understandably, China has relatively little experience dealing with 
international students compared to many Western countries. Survey respondents and 
interviewees have reported communication problems, inconsistent university policies, lack of 
attention given to international students academically and personally, as well as racism 
among Chinese teachers and students. For those with little or no Chinese language 
background, the yearlong Chinese language program that predates university often cannot 
fully prepare them for university courses taught in Chinese. Though some universities offer 
majors that are taught in English, the major options are extremely limited. Language barrier 
and the consequent academic incompetency will directly affect Arab students’ 
competitiveness against their Chinese counterparts in job searching. In addition, the relatively 
low standards of admission have made it easy for some universities to attract a large number 
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of Arab students, but the quality of students can have a direct impact on the ways they can 
contribute to future Sino-Arab relations as well.  
Based on the feedback from Arab students as well as my observation, I propose 
several ways in which Chinese university programs can be improved:  
 
1) raise standards of admission, which will ensure that the academic coursework 
matches students’ levels and abilities; 
2) promote publicity overseas so that more people will be aware of the opportunities 
in China, which will expand the pool of applicants; 
3) encourage international students to explore diverse major fields, which will 
broaden their career horizons and foster future talents in different fields; 
4) diversify the levels and lengths of Chinese language programs, which will better 
prepare students for major coursework in Chinese; 
5) research the academic backgrounds of students from different countries, which will 
help teachers understand the needs of international students and learn from 
experiences of other countries; 
6) recruit more qualified English-speaking instructors, which will allow universities to 
have more majors taught in English and improve their quality;  
7) create a standardized system for all Chinese universities to solve common issues of 
international students instead of relying on the discretion of individual university 
staff;  
8) hold cultural events and courses on campus in order to encourage cultural exchange, 
promote diversity, and combat racism; 
9) ensure that university websites and application are multilingual, which will help 
international students access information more easily;  
	   62	  
10) establish large university networks with schools in other countries so that credits 
at Chinese universities can be easily transferred to and from elsewhere;  
11) increase the amount of merit-based scholarships, which will not only attract more 
outstanding students but also ease their financial burdens; 
12) monitor the allocation of scholarships by governments in certain countries, since 
some local officials in the past have “sold” scholarship opportunities to students 
(information obtained through conversation with Arab students); and 
13) regulate the visa procedure for students from certain countries, as some Chinese 
foreign service staff were bribed to expedite the visa process for some while 
ignoring others for months (information obtained through conversation with Arab 
students).  
 
As the number of Arab students in China continues to increase, Chinese universities 
should also develop strategies to improve their academic experiences. Quality university 
education will further improve China’s image in the minds of these students; it will also 




Results from my survey and interviews suggest that a vast majority of Arab students 
hope to stay and work in China, which they believe will offer better career prospects than 
their home countries. To make full use of their language and other skills, some Arab students 
have taken part-time jobs in Sino-Arab trade while still studying (though they are generally 
not allowed to work while on student visas). Among those who have graduated, many have 
joined Arab businesses in trading cities such as Guangzhou and Yiwu, while others have 
worked for Chinese companies that seek to expand markets in the Arab World. Regardless of 
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their fields of study and interest, trade remains the most popular career choice for Arab 
students in China.  
However, soft power expansion goes far beyond trade. Limiting the career options of 
Arab students in China will also limit the ways in which China can project its soft power. 
Judging from my own interactions with Arab students in China, those who have reported 
positive feelings of China are often open-minded and politically aware. In order to help these 
Arab students realize their full potential, the Chinese government can build channels that 
allow them to stay and work in China in fields other than trade. This would then require 
improving the quality of university programs to ensure these students’ competitiveness 
compared with their Chinese counterparts. On the other hand, China can also collaborate with 
governments and organizations in Arab states to generate career opportunities for students 
who want to return to their home countries.  
Media, for example, has been a weak link in China’s soft power projection overseas 
despite the multi-lingual CCTV channels. An inexperienced player in international 
broadcasting, China often uses language and concepts alien to foreign audience, making it 
difficult to project its desired images effectively.64 Moreover, the single-sided image of a 
great power presented in Chinese media often contains few practical implications, failing to 
convey China’s willingness to build mutual trust, share economic benefit, and strengthen 
cultural ties with the Arab World.65 At times it seems that Western media’s hostility to China 
has made its way to Arab audience as well, playing on the fear of another great power 
dominance in the region similar to that of the United States. Therefore, funding Arab students 
to study in relevant fields and take part in promoting China’s image in the Arab World may 
help enhance China’s media efficacy. Conversely, Chinese media reports on the Middle East 
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have also shown frequent inconsistencies of tone and lack of original observation, which 
sometimes reinforces the negative stereotypes about the region imported from Western media. 
Arab students in China can bring their perspectives on Middle Eastern issues to a Chinese 
audience, for whom the area is also relatively alien and frequently misunderstood. Media can 
potentially play a crucial role in building political trust between people of the two regions, 
but China still has a long way to go in this regard. 
Language and literature is another potential field of focus, as books can play a huge 
role in stimulating cultural and academic exchange between students and intellectuals in 
different countries. Since almost a thousand years ago, accounts of Arab travelers to the east 
had generated considerable interest in readers at home and inspired other travelers as well. 
Reading about people’s lives and thoughts in an unfamiliar part of the world may also help to 
decrease the sense of foreignness associated with that place. Unfortunately, contemporary 
Arabic and Chinese literature has not been translated extensively into each other’s language 
so far despite the richness of both. Compared to Western literature, contemporary Chinese 
literature remains less known in the Arab World.66 In fact, China has been sending Muslim 
students to Egypt since the early 20th century, many of whom went back to become 
translators of Arabic literary works into Chinese.67 We can reasonably expect some of today’s 
Arab students in China to take on similar tasks as well, contributing further to the cultural and 
intellectual exchange between the two regions. 
China may also consider providing internship programs that allow Arab students to 
gain teaching experiences in China and elsewhere. Some Arab students in the past have 
returned to their home countries and taught in their respective fields, but there still lacks 
systematic effort to foster such process. China may consider working with Arab governments 	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and other organizations to offer internship programs for Arab students in Chinese universities. 
For instance, some students may be interested in teaching Chinese in their home countries; 
others can work as Arabic instructors in China. Internship provision as such will not only 
allow students to gain teaching experiences and expand their career options, but it will also 
foster cultural and academic exchange between the two regions. As one of my interviewees 
put it, working as a teacher in his home country would allow him to bring back new ideas that 
he had been exposed to while studying in China. 
 There are many ways in which Arab students in China can contribute to future Sino-
Arab relations. The Chinese government has invested heavily in their university education, 
but graduation is only the beginning and not the end. In order to fully realize their potential, 
China needs to make a conscious effort to incorporate them into its soft power projection 
through diverse channels. As Arab students are crowding into trading cities willingly and 
unwillingly, this may be a sign that other options are lacking.  
 
 
Soft Power: The Way Forward 
The increasing number of Arab students in Chinese universities may be one of the 
steps that China is taking to expand its soft power in the Arab World. To fully understand its 
implications, one may need to take a look at some of China’s other soft power strategies in 
the region. 
Unlike the United States and Russia, China has remained relatively detached from 
political affairs in the region to this day, upholding its non-intervention foreign policy and 
restraining the use of hard military power. Nevertheless, China has been cultivating closer 
relations with the Middle East through other means such as the China-Arab States 
Cooperation Forum, promoting cooperation in trade, energy, high technology, media, 
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education, environmental protection, and cultural exchange in the past ten years.68 In all cases, 
the Arab students studying in China today may become important middlemen helping to 
break down the cultural and political barriers between the two sides in the future. 
 
 
“One Belt, One Road” 
 Since September 2013, China has been actively promoting its grand “One Belt and 
One Road” initiative connecting over 60 countries across Asia, Europe, and Africa.69 
Reflecting on the ancient Silk Road, the Belt and Road initiative consists of the Silk Road 
Economic Belt, which will link China with Europe through Central and Western Asia, and 
the 21st Century Marine Silk Road, which will connect China with Southeast Asian countries, 
Africa and Europe.70 Economically, the initiative will facilitate trade, infrastructure building, 
transportation, and energy cooperation across the vast region. Culturally, countries along the 
Silk Road will promote tourism and cultural exchange.71 Since 2014, key players in the Arab 
World such as Egypt and GCC countries have all pledged support for the Belt and Road 
initiative.72 73 Having Arab students study in China may be part of the cultural plan as well. 
The Belt and Road initiative may be an indication that China’s hard power growth 
makes soft power even more necessary. For instance, China is determined to increase 
investment in infrastructure and other development projects along the Belt and Road, which 
can benefit many Arab states whose economies have been devastated by political turmoil  	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since the Arab Spring.74 With growing investments overseas, China is also likely to 
contribute more to international development and security. In an unprecedented move, China 
sent a warship to Yemen in April 2015 and evacuated foreign nationals residing in the 
conflict-ridden country, winning praise from countries of those evacuated.75 While growth of 
Chinese hard power has generated skepticism about its intentions, through the Belt and Road 
initiative China can potentially use its hard power to facilitate soft power expansion. 
The Belt and Road initiative, along with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
that funds its projects, has attracted countries and regions spanning far beyond the traditional 
Silk Road. The plan not only demonstrates China’s determination to expand its influence in 




However, plans that sound good in theory can be difficult to implement. The Belt and 
Road initiative, as well as China’s role in the Arab World in general, still face numerous 
challenges such as political turmoil in some Arab states, transnational terrorism, and ethnic 
tension within China. 
One of the biggest roadblocks on China’s Silk Road Economic Belt is the Islamic 
Caliphate (ISIS), which has occupied large areas in the Middle East and threatened to include 
China’s Xinjiang as part of its territory.76 According to a report by South China Morning Post, 
ISIS has recruited hundreds of Uyghur fighters from China who slipped out of the country 
through southern port cities, traveled through Southeast Asia, and arrived in the Middle East 	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to join the ISIS.77 The report also says that Uyghur students in Chinese universities have 
become targets of ISIS recruitment.78 Understandably, when I contacted universities in 
Guangzhou and asked if they could let their Arab students to take my survey, they denied my 
requests for fear of suspected terrorist connections. The linkage between ISIS and Chinese 
minority groups exacerbates China’s fear of domestic terrorist attacks, which have been on 
the rise since the early 2000s.  
The Silk Road Economic Belt is expected to strengthen the already close economic 
ties between China’s western regions of Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Ningxia to the Arab World, 
emphasizing their shared historical and religious heritage. Xinjiang is envisioned as a major 
component and beneficiary of the Silk Road Economic Belt, while increased railway 
transportation along the Belt will also connect the region more closely to Central Asia. As 
goods and ideas move more freely along the routes, so can terrorist activities spread more 
easily across borders. Therefore, despite its proclaimed non-intervention foreign policies, 
China has a high stake in peace and stability of the Middle East. As China’s minority regions 
become more interconnected with other parts of the Muslim World, it remains to be seen how 
ethnic, religious, and cultural tensions within China will play out. 
Interestingly, through conversation with Arab students, I have learned that many of 
them support the Chinese government’s policies prioritizing social stability over religious 
freedom. Coming from politically turbulent countries, many Arab students cherish the 
peaceful environment that Chinese society has to offer. Some have expressed favor toward 
China’s minority policies, apparently receptive of Chinese official media propaganda. Others, 
sympathetic to the struggle of many Chinese Muslims, dislike certain government policies 
that restrict religious freedom. Still, given their overwhelmingly positive impressions of 	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China and the Chinese government, it is possible that Arab students will play a positive role 
in soothing the ethnic tension within China in the future. At the same time, as ethnic and 
religious awareness rises among China’s minority population, increased contact with Arabs 
may also pull them away from their Chinese identity toward a common religious identity. 
 
 
Final Words: Clash or Harmony of Civilizations? 
In Clash of Civilizations?, Samuel Huntington claims that the Confucian-Islamic 
connection is the most prominent form of alliance that challenges Western interests, values, 
and power.79 To prevent this challenge from taking shape, he argues that the West should 
“exploit the differences between Confucian and Islamic states.”80 
In fact, the Confucian-Islamic civilizational exchange has been in place long before 
the rise of Western dominance. The two regions were connected by the Silk Road since 
almost 2000 years ago, and Islam reached China through Arab traders even before it reached 
parts of Arabia and North Africa.81 The two civilizations co-existed side by side with 
remarkably few major conflicts – Arabs pursued friendly relations with China on the basis of 
trade, while China opened its door to Muslim immigration.82 Today, China has retained 
around 25 million Muslims belonging to ten different ethnic groups,83 and members of these 
communities have served as Chinese envoys to the Middle East.84 In the 65 years following 
the founding of the PRC, the friendly relations between China and Arab states have remained 
remarkably consistent despite changing political landscapes in both regions. The Muslim-
majority provinces in western China have become hubs of Sino-Arab exchange, a strategy 	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that China uses to “find common ground while reserving differences”85 with Arab states. 
While Chinese military presence remains minimal in the Middle East, the historical, cultural, 
and religious connections between the Chinese and Islamic civilizations can potentially 
translate into China’s soft power in contemporary Sino-Arab relations. 
However, this does not mean that the two civilizations will have no problems 
interacting with each other today. For one thing, Western media has indeed contributed to the 
exploitation of differences between China and the Arab World proposed by Huntington. 
According Ma Lirong, professor and Associate Director at the Middle East Studies Institute 
Shanghai International Studies University, “Western media imperialism” played a substantial  
role in disrupting the normal contacts between China and Arab countries.86 Due to the 
dominance of Western media, its negative portrayal of China has made its way to the Arab 
World, while stereotypes of Arabs have also reached the Chinese audience. As Sino-Arab 
relationship continues to deepen over time, the negative media influence will not go away 
any time soon. 
As an increasingly number of Arab students study and settle in China, Arab 
immigration can lead to social changes within China as well. On the one hand, China may 
begin to face the same issues as many Western societies do. In Western Europe, as 
Huntington suggests, racism has become more pronounced in society and politics due to mass 
immigration from North Africa.87 Guangzhou, a southern metropolis and a major trading 
center, has already witnessed tension between its African immigrants and the local police in 
the past few years. The increasing number of Arab immigrants in China can lead to similar 
problems, but the Chinese society may also adjust to the change and more tolerant over time. 
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Lastly, the demographic change may also cause other social issues that are unique to 
China. Due to the difficult immigration process, many Arab students resort to marriage with 
Chinese citizens as a means to gain permanent residency in China. Since most of the Arab 
students and immigrants are male, their marriage with Chinese females may worsen the 
gender gap in China. For Arabs who have brought families to China from their home 
countries, their children often do not enjoy the same opportunities as Chinese children do. 
Without Chinese citizenship, children born to foreign parents can have a hard time enrolling 
in Chinese schools. As China further opens up itself, the government needs to adjust its 
immigration policies to make life easier for foreigners who wish to settle there. 
Overall, Arab students can contribute to China’s soft power in the Arab World, 
though it remains to be seen whether China’s soft power projection can bring about harmony, 
rather than clash, of civilizations. With all the opportunities and challenges they bring, Arab 
students studying in China today will be a valuable asset for Sino-Arab relations in the future. 
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Appendix II: Closeness to China 
 
  Oil Trade Arms Diplomacy Culture Closeness 
Algeria 2.6 7.7 94 7 0 -0.346 
Egypt 0 10.2 425 23 2  0.992 
Jordan 0 8.2 16 8 2  0.007 
Lebanon 0 10.5 0 4 1 -0.294 
Libya 1.8 7.8 0 5 0 -0.538 
Mauritania 0 32 0 2 0 -0.116 
Morocco 0 5.2 0 9 2 -0.057 
Palestine 0 4.6 0 10 0 -0.515 
Saudi Arabia 53.2 13.6 66 13 0  0.57 
Sudan 5.6 28.2 179 33 1  1.091 
Syria 0 2.8 0 10 0 -0.553 
Tunisia 0 3.6 0 8 1 -0.349 




Oil88 89 90: the amount of crude oil each country exported to China in 2013 measured in 
hundred  
thousand tons, e.g. Saudi Arabia exported 53,200,000 tons of crude oil to China in 2013. 
 
Trade91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100101102 103: the percentage that trade with China accounted for in each 
country’s total foreign trade volume in 2013, e.g. Sudan’s trade with China accounted for 
28.2% of its total foreign trade volume. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 “Country Analysis Brief: Algeria”, US Energy Info Administration, 24 July 2014, 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ag. 
89 Cenergy.org, “2013 nian woguo shiyou jinkou zengsu fanghuan, jinkou laiyuan duoyanghua xianxian” 2013
年我国石油进口增速放缓，进口来源多样化显现 [China’s Oil Import Growth Slowed in 2013, Showing 
Diversified Import Sources], Xinhua, 2 February 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/energy/2014-
02/02/c_126081716.htm. 
90 Duanfang Tao, “Nansudan neizhan huoji zhongguo ‘shiyou cunzai’ ” 南苏丹内战祸及中国“石油存在” 
[Civil War in South Sudan Hurts China’s ‘Oil Presence’], South Reviews, 16 January 2014, 
http://www.nfcmag.com/article/4510.html. 
91 “European Union, Trade in goods with Algeria”, European Commission Directorate-General for Trade. 
92 “European Union, Trade in goods with Egypt”, European Commission Directorate-General for Trade. 
93 “European Union, Trade in goods with Jordan”, European Commission Directorate-General for Trade. 
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Arms104: the total value of Chinese arms exports to each country between 2002 and 2011, 
measured in million dollars, e.g. Yemen imported $300 million worth of arms from China 
between 2002 and 2011. 
 
Diplomacy105: the number of diplomatic visits between each country and China between 
2011 and 2014, e.g. Egypt had 23 diplomatic exchanges with China between 2011 and 2014, 
which includes Egyptian diplomats visiting China as well as Chinese diplomats visiting 
Egypt. 
 
Culture106: the number of Confucius Institutes in each country, e.g. Jordan has 2 Confucius 
Institutes. 
 
Closeness: based on the five indicators listed above, we generated a scale using the z-scores 
that measures each country’s overall closeness to China. The larger the number, the closer the 
country is to China. 
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95 “European Union, Trade in goods with Libya”, European Commission Directorate-General for Trade. 
96 “European Union, Trade in goods with Mauritania”, European Commission Directorate-General for Trade. 
97 “European Union, Trade in goods with Morocco”, European Commission Directorate-General for Trade. 
98 “European Union, Trade in goods with Palestine”, European Commission Directorate-General for Trade. 
99 “European Union, Trade in goods with Saudi Arabia”, European Commission Directorate-General for Trade. 
100 “European Union, Trade in goods with Sudan”, European Commission Directorate-General for Trade. 
101 “European Union, Trade in goods with Syria”, European Commission Directorate-General for Trade. 
102 “European Union, Trade in goods with Tunisia”, European Commission Directorate-General for Trade. 
103 “European Union, Trade in goods with Yemen”, European Commission Directorate-General for Trade. 
104 Olimat, 62. 
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